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Scientific views on human variation and the relationship between humans and apes 
changed dramatically between 1700-1900.  This paper traces the history of those changes 
from an initial consensus on the homogeneity of man and on casual models tied to 
environmental contrasts to the turn of the 20th century when "race was everything".  Over 
the course of these two centuries new sciences were born and matured and vast quantities 
of data were collected, generated and digested.  Yet, paradoxically, while the 
overwhelming majority of data indicated that discrete interpopulational contrasts among 
humans were elusive, the broader social constructs, likely among them economics, would 
rely on a scientific foundation that viewed the differences as innate and fixed.  By the 
turn of the twentieth century Europeans and European-Americans would explain their 
economic and military superiority in biological terms, even if contradicted by the data.  
Through an analysis of changing perspectives on the key underlying constructs of 
essentialism, fixity and ranking, we try to understand these shifting views on the nature of 
human variation. 
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 Economists (and their enemies) were not alone in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
in trying to understand why Europeans and some of their descendants dominated the rest of the 




anthropology and biology tackled this question, too, as well as the deeper and more fundamental 
questions of what human beings are, how they fit into the scheme of the natural world, and how 
they differ from one another. 
 In this paper we will try to give a brief overview of what those answers were and how 
they changed.  We will not try to demonstrate direct links between natural scientists and 
economists; such close textual analysis is beyond our capabilities and the scope of this paper.  
We think it highly likely, though, that economists were influenced by the natural science of the 
day, just as today's environmental economists pay close attention to what meteorologists say 
about global warming. We are examining the ocean in which classical and early neoclassical 
economists swam, not the molecules that passed through their gills. 
 Our basic story is this:  An initial consensus on the homogeneity of man and on causal 
models tied to environmental contrasts would be recast to an increasing focus on the 
heterogeneity of humankind and the innate and fixed nature of his condition.  While the cultural 
superiority of the European was rarely in doubt, by the close of the 19th century his rank would 
be validated not only by behavior but by biology as well.  This fundamental shift was 
concomitant with a flurry of scientific research into the nature of human variation, the 
culmination of which would be the formal birth of the discipline of physical anthropology in the 
early 20th century.  One paradox is that while the overwhelming majority of data indicated that 
discrete interpopulational contrasts among humans were elusive, broader social constructs would 
rely on a scientific foundation that saw, to use anatomist Robert Knox's aphorism, "With me, 
race or hereditary descent is everything: it stamps the man." (1862, p. 6). 
 Throughout the paper we will maintain the assumption that the consensus among leading 
natural scientists today about human variation and race is correct.  That is presumptuous, but it is 




consider wrote about race was wrong--and many of them were wrong in a way that we take 
today to be hideously immoral.  No surprise--we wouldn't use Galen's writings to treat a sick 
child or Newton's to hook up a stereo.  Following the example of the classical economists, we 
will think these natural scientists as neither mean nor stupid. 
 The puzzle in the record of natural science in this time period is that the bad ideas not 
only persisted, they got worse in many senses.  Ordinarily, most economists think that bad ideas-
-incorrect beliefs about people or technology--should die out, either quickly or gradually.  Over 
time, evidence accumulates, and forces the rejection of more propositions (for instance, 
believing that centrally planned economies are likely to grow fast in the long run was a lot easier 
in 1910 than it is in 2002).  Moreover, people whose beliefs are correct will in most cases do 
better than people whose beliefs are wrong, and either put them out of business or induce them to 
imitate.  Our implicit belief that these two processes are at work means that almost all of us think 
that scholars know more than they did 40 years ago, that what we ourselves personally believe 
today is better than what we believed ten years ago, and that technological progress will continue 
over the next half century. 
 In our case, though, as evidence accumulated, conclusions got worse.  Later scientists 
had better data, better resources, better methods--but they missed the big point by a much wider 
margin.  One task of this paper will be trying to understand why.  We will concentrate on the 
question of why better evidence failed to give scientists a better understanding of race.  Why the 
economic process--prosperity and survival for the fittest ideas--also failed, is a question for other 
papers.  
 We begin our history of thought with a necessary preliminary:  the background, both 
intellectual and factual, that set the stage for the often dramatic changes in logic and reasoning 




the 18th and 19th centuries.  The importance of these underlying constructs can not be 
understated as they will be revived repeatedly; many rising from the ashes to serve as pillars for 
racial ideology.  
 
I.  Background 
 By 1700, the Renaissance and several centuries of overseas voyages had brought 
Europeans, northern Europeans especially, into contact with plants, animals and civilizations 
they had never before dreamed of.  The Americas, the Pacific Ocean, most of Asia, sub-Saharan 
Africa, Russia, and even northern Scandinavia presented Europeans with new plants and animals 
and introduced them to people who looked, talked, and acted differently from all the people they 
had known.  The primary sources of knowledge, the "empirical" data, were the accounts of 
travellers, missionaries, merchants, and other explorers who recorded what they had seen.  
Blumenbach cited 80 such sources in his work including the writings of Marco Polo.  Bernier 
(1684) stands as a rarity, a classifier who had actually travelled and seen those whom he was 
classifying.   Understanding how all these new discoveries fit together and how they could be 
made consistent with what Europeans knew already was the fundamental challenge that 
Enlightenment science faced. 
 For the history of race, one of the most important discoveries at this time were the true 
apes.  For Europeans, Andrew Battel's 1625 report of a creature that is likely a chimpanzee is the 
first definitive account of a true ape (although short anecdotes appear in Marco Polo and similar 
travelogues).  It is not until 1699 and the publication of Edward Tyson's dissection of an infant 
chimp that we see the formal entry of apes into the consciousness of Western science. 
 And so, when the early taxonomists write about the apes, they reference newly 




increased importation of zoological specimens and the Congress of Vienna agreements allowing 
cross-national access to materials, that broad based and comprehensive anatomical analyses 
could be conducted.  It wasn't until 1795 that Geoffrey St. Hilaire and Cuvier clearly 
differentiated the chimpanzee from the orang utan.  In fact, the first gorillas specimens for study 
were not obtained until 1847 and the first live gorillas did not arrive in Europe and the US until 
1855 and 1898, respectively.  The mountain gorilla was not even known until 1902. 
 European literature is, of course, replete with references to "apes" before Battel and 
Tyson.  But these references aren't about true apes at all; they are actually about monkeys, most 
probably tailless barbary macaques.  True apes approximate human form and behavior much 
more closely than barbary macaques do; This is evident even in the names used by local 
inhabitants, for example, "orang utan" means "man of the forest" in Malay.  Europeans first met 
apes at the same time they met sub-Saharan Africans--an association that would have a long 
history. 
 In trying to understand the apes and the many other new discoveries, Europeans turned 
first to their intellectual inheritance in both the classics and in Christianity.  As Hannaford 
(1996) cogently demonstrates, the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Herodotus, Tacitus, Strabo, and 
others would be "plundered", and often distorted and misconstrued in an attempt at validation.  
Herodotus, for example, often regarded as the first anthropologist, would be used to categorize 
the races of Europe, and Plato's myth of the metals would be used by Davenport in the 20th 
century for eugenicist ideas on race mixing. 
 The majority of modern classicists support the view that the Greco-Roman world was 
devoid of a concept of race in the modern sense, that it classified by political status and not by 
variability of physical form.  Nevertheless, classical antiquity would provide seminal 




the Great Chain of Being, and an environmental theory of human variation. 
 Plato's gift, essentialistic or typological thinking would have the greatest longevity; it was 
intrinsic to racial classifications until after World War II.  Some would even argue that it is still 
with us.  To quote paleoanthropologist Milford Wolpoff, "Typological thinking is part of our 
cultural heritage, a part of our mind-set; it is the way most of us organize the world.  And even if 
we 'know' not to apply it to biology, it seeps in anyway." (1997, p.317)  Rooted in the concept of 
the eidos, the world is seen as composed of distinct elements that are reflections of pure, fixed 
ideals or essences.  Variations among those elements are merely deviations, imperfections 
around the ideal type.   
 The second concept, the Great Chain of Being, would at times be met with direct 
challenge but it too would play a critical role at several historical junctures.  The idea was 
derived by medieval scholars from Aristotle for whom the universe was filled with distinct biotic 
elements ordered according to imperceptible continuous gradations.  A biological link between 
forms was not implied; rather all life was held fixed positions or ranks along a linear chain of 
being.    
 The final element, dating back to Hippocrates, attempts to provide an environmental 
explanation for human variation.  Differences, both physical and behavioral, were seen resulting 
from diverse environmental phenomena, not innate contrasts.  While there were different 
variants of this perspective, among them Aristotle's polar principles and Diodorus' global zones, 
the Greco-Roman Environmental Theory was the basis for the classical view of other peoples 
(Hannaford, 1996).  This is not to say that these views represent a monolithic construct in Greco-
Roman thought; there was indeed some ambiguity.  The vital point, however, is that the 
taxonomies of the 1700s and 1800s, including the classification of humans, would be built firmly 




environmental theory of causation. 
 Classical attitudes toward the apes they knew (i.e., barbary macaques) also influenced 
how Europeans thought about true apes.  The general attitude was summed up by poet Quintus 
Ennius: "Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis" (the ape, how similar that most ugly beast 
is to us).  In a classical world with blurry lines between men and gods and apes, Aristotle and 
Galen were not troubled by their findings of great morphological similarity; though apes were 
ugly. 
 Blurry lines between man and god and ape were not a feature of Christianity, the other 
great intellectual tradition the Enlightenment inherited.  The overriding principles were a single 
origin of all life and the unity of mankind.  The basis for this unity was man's rationality and 
morality.  Augustine's formulation was clear: 
 "Whoever is anywhere born a man, that is, a rational mortal animal, no matter  what 




 Thus the Church discouraged the idea that humans were more than one species.  Bruno  
 
(1591) and Vanini (1619) both put forward this idea, but it was not well received.  Bruno was  
 
burned at the stake while Vanini's tongue was cut out.  Then he was strangled at the stake and  
 
his body burned to ashes. 
 
 Christianity also forced a change in how apes were viewed.  With the rise of Christianity, 
the ape would turn into a "figura diabolica", then to a sinner, and ultimately into a fool.  Thomas 
Aquinas' anatomical analysis found, contrary to Galen, that there were no anatomical similarities 
between "apes" and humans. 
 
II.  The Enlightenment 
  A.  How Nature and Humanity Fit Together 
 The big problems that Enlightenment anthropology and biology confronted were first, 
how to reconcile the apparent fact that creatures very similar to the dogs, cats, sheep and humans 
that we now see had always existed with the readily observed diversity of those creatures today.  
The Egyptians had cats just like we do, but no two cats are exactly the same.  Enlightenment 
anthropologists also had to explain how humans could be both animals in physical appearance 
and bodily functioning, but also (obviously) superior to them. 
 The interfertility criterion for species membership, sometimes attributed to Ray (1691), 
started the Enlightenment on the way to sorting out these puzzling new phenomena.  The basic 
idea, two individuals are members of the same species if they can breed together and produce 
fertile offspring.  The utility of this criterion becomes apparent in the grand natural systems of 




 Voegelin (1998, p. 29) explains how Linnaeus used the interfertility criterion to solve the 
first of the Enlightenment's two great puzzles.  Since all living creatures emerge from an egg and 
each egg produces a creature that resembles its parents, no new species are produced in the 
current epoch.  Thus each species must have an original ancestor (either a hermaphrodite or a 
pair differing in gender).  Each species is a unity that can be traced back to God. 
 The essence or germ (to use Kant's term) of each species was thus present at its creation, 
and passes down from generation to generation.  But the germ is an algorithm, not a blueprint; it 
carries a rule for reacting to the circumstances a member of the species may confront.  The 
phenotypes of various members of the species are just realizations of the underlying invisible 
essence.  Nothing new is added as the history of a species unfolds; contingencies are just played 
out according to rules that were embedded in the germ in the beginning. 
 While nothing could be added to the instructions with which each species was endowed, 
it was possible (various thinkers differed on this point) for parts of those instructions to be lost 
through atrophy.  "The potential of developing in one or another direction was already present, 
but it was realized only when particular external conditions occurred, which then favored the 
unfolding of one potential while allowing others to wither." (Voegelin, 1998 p. 36)  The 
phenotypes of the original members of the species, while not necessarily perfect representatives 
of the essence, were thus better representations than subsequent generations because they were 
closer to the God's hand, and because no potential had been allowed to wither.  The dogs in the 
Garden of Eden had within them both the instructions for creating collies and the instructions for 





 This combination of eternal essences and contingent realizations neatly solves the 
Enlightenment's biological problem.  It reconciles the fixity of species and the diversity of 
individuals. 
 The second problem, reconciling humans to the natural world, did not call forth such a 
neat solution.  The interfertility criterion would not permit scientists to look at humans as 
anything other than a single species, since most claimed to be aware of inter-breeding between 
different types of people ("mulatto" is first cited by the Oxford English Dictionary in 1595; 
"quadroon" in 1707).  Beyond the fact of interfertility, scientists need a way of telling one 
species from another, a differentia specifica (per Aristotle) or a differentia essentialis (per Ray).  
I know that two creatures cannot produce fertile offspring, but how do I know which is a 
mosquito and which a pig?  The Enlightenment's second problem then boiled down to finding a 
differentia essentialis for humans.  A differentia essentialis that was purely somatic would place 
humans on a par with animals; one that was purely spiritual would place animals on a par with 
humans. 
 Enlightenment writers tried several different approaches to this problem.  Linnaeus in the 
first edition of Systema Naturae in 1735 places man within the category Anthropomorpha, the 
first division of the Quadrupedia, under the category for clawed animals (the grouping for 
animals with four incisors, four fingers and hairy bodies).  His classification was based on 
morphological similarity;  for him, the unique distinguishing characteristic of man was the 
possession of a rational soul (nosce te ipsum), and as such irrelevant to this taxonomy. 
 "I cannot discover the difference between man and the orangoutang, although all of 
 my attention was brought to bear on this point, except for laying hold of some 
 uncertain characteristics." (Cited in Stepan, 1982, p. 7) 
 
 Linnaeus' 1758 edition offered refinements.  He replaced the term Anthropomorpha with 




apes), Lemur and Vespertillo (bats).  Even with this change, there was insistence that the 
distinction between man and other animals be drawn more sharply.  Thomas Penant would write 
(1771), "I reject {Linnaeus's} first division, which he calls Primates, or foremost in creation, 
because my vanity will not suffer me to rank mankind with apes monkeys and bats." (Cited in 
Thomas, 1982, p. 110) 
 Buffon (1749), took an approach that was in many ways the opposite of Linnaeus:  
 "[That there is an infinite distance between the faculties of man and those of the most 
 perfect animal evidently proves that man is of a different nature...one passes all at 
 once from the thinking being to the material being, from the intellectual power to 
 mechanical force, from order and design to blind movement, from reflection to 
 appetite." (Cited in Voegelin, 1998, p. 48) 
 
 Only at the end of the Enlightenment, in Blumenbach and in Kant is there a recognizably 
modern resolution to this problem.  They define humans as part of nature in purely somatic 
terms.  Blumenbach (1779/1780) would focus on morphology and its concomitant functional ties 
(including language and reason) to distinguish man.  For him, man is distinguished from the ape 
by, "[T]he power of walking erect ...; the facility with which he uses two perfect hands; and the 
prominence of his chin, with the perpendicular direction of the lower incisor teeth." (p. 67)  
(Notice we are comparing "man" and "the Ape", two essences, not "humans" and "apes", two 
populations.)  Based on these  characteristics, Blumenbach called for the ordinal separation of 





  B.  Varieties of Humans 
 Enlightenment scientists looked at the different varieties of humans in this context.  The 
human essence was created once, and had been passed down to us since then.  There were 
several important implications:  Variety came from environment, the number of races was small, 
many different traits mattered, races were not ordered in a hierarchy, and Africans were currently 
problematic.  We will discuss each of these implications in turn. 
 
    1.  Variety Comes from Environment 
 Although all humans shared the same essence, they differed because they lived in 
different environments.  Some people found themselves in the tropics and the algorithm 
produced dark skin, wide lips, and woolly hair.  Others found themselves in the arctic and the 
algorithm produced epicanthic folds and tawny skin, and so on.  In general, people who lived in 
different places should look and act differently, in response to their environment. 
 Buffon sets forth this theory of causation most emphatically.  He offers three causative 
factors, chief among them climate, followed by diet and to a minor extent customs.  With such an 
environmental theory and dynamic view of nature, human differences are seen as superficial.  
Moreover, they are seen as flexible; change was possible (within 8-12 generations), and "race 
persists as long as the milieu remains."   
 Blumenbach echoes the same environmental explanation:  "Color... is at all events, an 
adventitious and easily changeable thing and can never constitute a diversity of species."  (Cited 
Gould, 1994 p. 68.)  He also attributed most of the diversity in head form to mode of life and to 
art. 
    2.  The Number of Races is Small 




races be a half dozen or less.1  Partly this desire for a small number of races grew out of 
taxonomic neatness, but it was validated by an implicit theory of natural history.  In modern 
terms, this theory of natural history is called the ancient candelabra (and it has very little modern 
support).  The idea is that certain large groups of people have been separated from each other, 
isolated and restricted to breeding with cousins, for very long periods of time.  Thus Kant, in 
defining the term "race", emphasizes that it is part of natural history, not nature, a source of 
information about causes, not a static descriptor. 
 The ancient candelabra theory is perhaps best illustrated in the predominant Christian 
view of the origins of Africans, which probably influenced the scientists of the time.  Sub-
Saharan Africans were descendants of Ham, one of Noah's children.  In particular, all of their 
ancestors after Ham were also Ham's descendants; no inter-breeding with non-descendants 
occurred in the intervening millennia. 
 Enlightenment scientists knew that environment worked slowly--Europeans who went to 
the tropics did not develop wide noses--and so long periods of reproductive isolation were 
needed to produce the diversity they were finding among humans.  But reproductive isolation 
was plausible only for big bunches of people--blocks on the order of continents, not countries--
and so the number of races had to be small. 
 Thus, for instance, Bernier and Camper both had four (the latter's followed the division of 
the continents), and Leibnitz distinguished five.  Blumenbach has four races in his first edition 
and five in his second.  And Kant, coming from philosophy, has four races based on climate, the 
two by two interaction of temperature and humidity. 
    3.  Many Traits Matter 
 Man's special place in nature implied that salient differences should not merely be 




intellectual as well as physical, and so the distinctions among human varieties should be made on 
these grounds as well.  Throughout the Enlightenment typologies, then, we find groups 
distinguished by philosophy, culture, habits of mind and general beauty. 
 Giordano Bruno and Jean Bodin both attempted an elementary geographic arrangement 
of populations using skin color.  The latter's account was purely descriptive, and included such 
neutral terms as "duskish colour, like roasted quince, black, chestnut, fairish and white" (cited in 
Slotkin, 1965, p. 43).  These were followed by philosopher Gottfried Leibnitz (1690/1718) who 
focused on skin color and hair color and form and John Ray (1691) who relied on stature, shape, 
skin color as well as food habits.  Brief descriptions of other "peculiarities" were also offered 
often--comments that today would sound like, "New Yorkers talk fast and they wear black."   
 Linnaeus, whose approach to taxonomy would be adopted by future generations, does not 
offer any subdivisions among men in his first edition of Systema Naturae in 1735.  In the 1740 
version he adds four geographical subdivisions (Europaeus, Americanus, Asiaticus, and 
Africanus).  These divisions would remain through the 12th and final edition in 1768.  Critically, 
they are presented as categories below level of species, and they are not ranked any more than 
divisions of a genus.  It is only with the 10th edition, the edition in which he created the Primates 
as the first order, that he abandons his heretofore exclusive reliance on anatomical features.  The 
tenth edition is important, not only because it marks for many the beginning of taxonomy proper 
(due to the consistency in methodology) but also because it marks a dramatic change in the 
treatment of differences among humans.  Here, his approach to humans will differ from his 
classification of other animals because sociocultural aspects of temperament, character, clothing 
and customs become part of the classification.  While he is not the first taxonomist to include 
such data, he was the first to make it scientific.  He draws on ancient and medieval theories of 




ruled by custom, Europaeus is sanguine and ruled by laws, Asiaticus is melancholy and ruled by 
opinion, Afer is phlegmatic and ruled by caprice (Slotkin, 1944 pp. 461-462). 
 One of the most long-lasting contributions of Linnaeus was to legitimize for future 
generations the idea that they could be subdivided into groups.  As Marks states, "This 
assumption is ultimately what students of human diversity owe to Linnaeus." (1995, p. 52) 
    4.  There is No Hierarchy 
 The scientists who enumerated these types of mankind did so without ranking them.  
They considered the majority of contrasts superficial in nature and the divisions themselves, 
arbitrary.  Europeans were seen by Buffon and Blumenbach as the most likely original form from 
which changes occurred but this did not imply deterioration, but only environmentally produced 
modification.  Linnaeus does not even rank his non-human categories.  While his attitudes to the 
superiority of humans appear evident, his seminal approach was to replace a unidimensional 
great chain with a two dimensional pattern, horizontal and vertical with categories of equal rank. 
 There was hierarchy but all classes were equally classes and not ranked.   
 Blumenbach added another reason for rejecting hierarchy: 
 "Innumerable varieties of mankind run into one another by insensible degrees....[N]o 
 variety exists, whether of colour, countenance, or stature...as not to be connected  
 with others of the same kind by such an imperceptible transition, that it is very clear 
 they are all related, or only differ from each other in degree."  (1776/1795, p. 35.) 
 
He emphasized that discrete divisions among humans were elusive and that the process 
was often arbitrary.  This lack of discreteness as human form graded from one people to the next 
would be central to Blumenbach's view of the unity of mankind.  As noted earlier, his argument 
for an ordinal separation of man was part of an overall goal to emphasize the unity of the species. 
 For Blumenbach, all human races were alike, they were united in mind, "The human mind is 




 Contra to Linnaeus, by his third edition Blumenbach relied solely on physical criteria and 
explicitly omitted reference to cultural traits and broad inferences about personality.  For 
Blumenbach, "There is no single character so peculiar and so universal among the Ethiopians 
[i.e., Africans], but that it may be observed on the one hand everywhere in other varieties of 
men." (Cited in Gould, 1994, p. 68). 
 In his first publication, Blumenbach adopted Linnaeus' four varieties, in his third, he 
would add a fifth, Malay.  With this step, as Gould (1994) argues, he forever changed the 
geometry of race from cartographic to one that could be misinterpreted as indicating a linear 
hierarchy of worth, and would be.  As for the Great Chain of Being, Blumenbach's rejection of 
the concept would serve as the standard for British students of racial science in the early part of 
the 19th century (Stepan, 1982).  
    5.  Africans are Currently Problematic   
 Though many different divisions of mankind into races were developed, they had one 
element in common:  almost all Europeans were always in one race, and almost all sub-Saharan 
Africans were always in another.  All the differences are among other groups (and extreme polar 
Africans and Europeans, the Hottentots and the Laplanders). 
      Enlightenment writers also generally say better things about Europeans than they about 
other races, and worse things about Africans.  This view that Europeans are better than Africans 
differs from the similar view that later scientists held in two important dimensions.  First, the 
Enlightenment scientists (except for Sömmering) did not claim to have objective data to support 
their beliefs; they just took it as a common understanding, a shared social belief.  You don't need 
to write a footnote when you claim, for instance, that India is poorer than the United States or 
that malaria is bad for people. 




because they live in a better climate, Africans are ugly because they live in a horrible climate.  
Thus Buffon (1749, p. 15) writes:   
 "The most temperate climate lies between the 40th and 50th degrees of latitude, and it 
 produces the most handsome and beautiful men.  It is from this climate that the ideas 
 of the genuine color of mankind, and the various degrees of beauty, ought to be 
 derived.  The two extremes are equally remote from truth and from beauty."  
 
Consistent with this notion that lousy climate produces lousy people is the low opinion that 
many writers (Bernier and Buffon especially) held of Laplanders, whom even Blumenbach 
excluded from the European race).  According to Bernier: "They are little, stunted creatures with 
thick legs, large shoulders, short neck, and a face elongated immensely; very ugly and partaking 
much of the bear...[T]hey are wretched animals." (1684, p.3)2 
 Not all Enlightenment thinkers were in step with scientists on this weak view of 
European superiority.  There was considerable evidence in favor of a stronger position.  
European military superiority, for one thing, was becoming overwhelming; you couldn't make 
money placing bets on non-European countries.  Incomes were beginning to diverge notably.  
And it is not inconsistent, if you base your belief in the unity of mankind on the Bible and 
Christian tradition, to value possession of that tradition. 
 Thus Kant (1775, p. 55) writes:  
 The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling.  Mr.  Hume 
challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown talents,  and asserts 
that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported  elsewhere from their 
countries, although many of them have even been set free, still  not a single one was ever 
found who presented anything great in art or science or any  other praiseworthy quality; 
even though among the whites some continually rise aloft  from the lowest rabble, and through 
superior gifts earn respect in the world.  So  fundamental is the difference between those two 
races of men, and it appears to be as  great in regard to mental capacities as in color.  The 
religion of fetishes so  widespread among them is perhaps a sort of idolatry that sinks as deeply 
into the  trifling as appears to be possible to human nature.   
(By contrast, Blumenbach established a special library in his house devoted exclusively to 





  C.  An African-American Looks at the Enlightenment 
 Although most Enlightenment writers accepted the current inferiority of non-Europeans, 
at least implicitly, much of the Enlightenment approach was well received among 
African-American thinkers.  As late as 1854, when Frederick Douglass addressed The Claims of 
the Negro, Ethnologically Considered, he uses familiar reasoning to argue for the unity of the 
human race:  polygenism would throw into question the Genesis account, animals are 
instinctively subject to the domain of Negroes as well as whites, and mental and physical 
differences arise from the environment, not from heredity. 
     "[F]lat feet, long arms, high cheek bones and retreating forehead" result from strenuous 
 labor with little intellectual engagement; they are not immutable." (p. 29) 
 
 Douglass, like John Stuart Mill, is echoing familiar themes from the Enlightenment.  
Humans are essentially united and distinct from the apes, environment causes differences and 
can eliminate them, and science demands no hierarchy.  But he is echoing them in 1854 and 




III.  Natural Science after the Enlightenment 
 As Stanton (1960, p. 11) states, in the 1700s the, "concept of equality was a scientific 
concept."  It rested on the unity of mankind through a single origin, on a similar morphology and 
on the importance of environmental factors in explaining man's physical as well as his mental 
diversity.  The consensus on equality began to fray at the end of the 18th century.  As both 
Europe and North America became embroiled in controversies over slavery and colonialism, 
new, dramatically different perspectives arose.  In Europe, the Great Chain of Being was 
revived.  In the U.S., monogenism was contested and lost its primacy.  On both sides of the 
Atlantic, environmental explanations were rejected and human differences, both physical and 
behavioral, came to be seen increasingly as fixed, discrete, and indicative of an ordering.  As a 
result, by midcentury, the fate of science and racial thought would be linked.  It would be 
impossible to separate them, and within the broader social sphere, a biological rooted pessimism 
about the human condition prevailed.   
 While economic, political, and social factors all played important roles, this reorientation 
can also be linked to fundamental changes in science.  We may not like their conclusions better 
but the 19th century produced better empirical scientists than the 18th. 
 
  A.  The Great Chain Returns 
 It is difficult to pinpoint the reasons for the reemergence of the Great Chain.  One 
explanation points to the sheer "naturalness" of it, as increasing complexity in life forms could 
be seen at all turns (Stepan, 1982).  Another alternative is that the association and seeming 
proximity between man and apes was too deeply embedded in Western European thought to 
disappear.  A third approach relates directly to methodological and theoretical changes within 




substantial.  In brief, the early 1800s (1800-1830) saw the development of the fields of 
comparative anatomy, physiology, histology as well as paleontology.  The idea of gradation 
proved central to these comparative studies and interestingly, was central to the biological work 
of both Cuvier and Lamarck who held polar views on the idea of evolutionary change (Figlio, 
1976).  Friedrich Tiedemann's (1816) classic embryological work examined the gradations 
among life forms and linked them to the development of human fetuses and children.  While he 
never linked embryology to racial differences (in fact he would argue counter to most of his 
contemporaries in another famous work (1836) that there were no differences between the brains 
of Africans and Europeans) others would make that association, saying that some races are more 
like children; others are more like adults.  By mid-century the idea that the races formed a graded 
series had become a foundation in racial science.   
 Despite the fact that the repudiation of the Great Chain had been a central element of the 
British monogenist argument, from this time on even ardent monogenists spoke of gradations in 
form.  Situating human diversity on the Great Chain meant that what was once seen as 
superficial and arbitrary was now rigid and innate; a permanent difference in the essential 
natures of these groups.  This ranking pertained to physical traits as well as to moral, intellectual 
and social qualities.  It was nature, not man that prevented civilized behavior.  Now that the 
hierarchy was firmly reentrenched, the only question was how best to measure it.  The initial 
answer through roughly 1850 was an overwhelming (though not monolithic) chorus of non-
European biological inferiority as voiced by the likes of White, Smith, Prichard, Lawrence, 
Cuvier, Morton, Agassiz, and Broca.  The continuing search for answers would be the goal of 
research for the remainder of the century.   
 The new position of Africans on the Great Chain would place them in closer proximity to 




simultaneous), with both the human and ape inhabitants of Africa, were given scientific support. 
 While some researchers would avoid or object ((Huxley, Owen) to any such association, others 
saw it clearly in one or more features (Hunt, Lawrence, Cuvier).   Charles White, for example, 
in An Account of the Regular Gradation in Man (1799) compared Africans to apes with respect 
to genitalia and menstrual cycles.  In 1817, George Cuvier, continental Europe's preeminent 
biologist wrote about the 'Negro' race, "The projection of the lower parts of the face, and the 
thick lips, evidently approximate it to the monkey tribe...." (p. 44) 
 In Britain, too, scientists moved away from fundamental conclusions of Enlightenment 
science.  James Prichard, who held for flexibility and change, looked to biological "sports" as the 
causative agent for variation.  For him, climate could have an influence though it did not create 
biological diversity.  Further, he saw the original or stemrace as African with Europeans as the 
later development.  William Lawrence's comments suggest the looming shadow of the Great 
Chain "That the Negro is more like a monkey than the European...cannot be denied as a general 
observation." (Cited in Gossett, 1965, p. 57)  
 
  B.  Polygeny Gains Ground 
 1.  History 
 Polygeny, the view that different races have different origins and are different species, 
was the major challenge to Enlightenment science in the first half of the 19th century.  As noted 
earlier, the overwhelming consensus of scientists in the 18th century was that despite the evident 
diversity in form and behavior, mankind represented a single type, a single species, bound by a 
common origin.  Towards the end of the 1700s, polygenist theories reappeared.  Influential 
voices, such as those of Voltaire and Kames would pose their challenge primarily to church 




was a polygenist.  In the next century these ideas would find broad based support.   
 The trajectory of this debate takes different courses in Britain, on the Continent, and in 
the US.  In Europe the debate was quashed dramatically on March 9, 1830 when Cuvier, a strict 
creationist, thoroughly routed Geoffroy Saint Hillaire in debate at the Academy of Science in 
Paris.  As a result, the analysis of human variability in Europe was nearly silenced through the 
first half of the century. 
 In Britain, where scientists tended to be more religiously orthodox than those in Europe 
(Stepan, 1982), the leading students of race, Prichard and Lawrence, stood firmly with the views 
of Linnaeus, Buffon and Blumenbach on origins.  They put forth a formidable challenge to the 
polygenist voices that began to gain strength in the 1840s.  By 1860 James Hunt would lead the 
polygenist voice in British science, but while it would have important implications for the future 
of anthropology as a discipline in Britain, it clearly remained a minority view. 
 The United States, in contrast, was the prime battlefield for the debate over origins.  
Proponents of slavery and of abolition were on both sides of the issue.  In fact, among the 
leading voices championing the monogenist perspective in the US, most were proslavery 
(Bachman, Cartwright, Fitzhugh).  Further, few would attempt to argue from a scientific 
perspective.  John Bachman, a clergyman, challenged  Morton (on the fertility of hybrids and 
"natural repugnance") and Agassiz (on the existence of discrete geographic divisions among 
races), though increasingly his positions would be rejected as unscientific.  
 On the other side of the debate, science would not only join other polygenist voices, it 
would take the lead in constructing a formidable argument.  Samuel George Morton's classic 
comparative analysis of cranial capacity, Crania Americana, would be coupled with Louis 
Agassiz's theoretical base.  The result, by 1850, through the allure of numbers and the muscle of 




most parsimonious way of explaining human variability.  The belief long-held in the wider social 
sphere of the relative ranking of Europeans, Native Americans, and Africans was now validated 
by "objective" scientific evidence.  At this point and hereafter, scientific method and theory 
become integral to any social construct of race.3 
 After Morton's death, Josiah Clark Nott and George Robin Gliddon would cloak 
themselves in the guise of science to continue as Morton's disciples.  Their 730 page tome, Types 
of Mankind published in 1854 was the leading American work on human races at the time.  In it, 
the association between Africans and apes was clearly highlighted through juxtaposed 
illustrations that typically exaggerated the "simian" features of the former and the "human" 
features of the later (pp. 458-459).  The comment on one comparison of an Algerian, a Saharran 
and a gorilla states, "The palpable analogies and dissimilitudes between an inferior type of 
mankind and a superior type of monkey require no comment."  (Cited in Gould, 1981 p. 67)  As 
with Voltaire, Nott and Gliddon aimed their attack at conservative theology, as Nott would call 
it, "parson skinning" (Gossett, 1965).  Still, their lectures on "niggerology", as they described it, 




 2.  Thought 
 Why did polygenists replace monogenists in the U.S.?  Why did race become more 
important than environment? 
 Part of the story are the obvious weaknesses and empirical shortcomings of the 
Enlightenment theories.  Thinking of the essence of a species as an algorithm was a nice move 
for explaining intra-species diversity, but it had the unfortunate empirical implications that 
acquired characteristics could be inherited and that "blacks" should turn "white" within a few 
generations in a temperate climate.  (And that the tans that Englishmen picked up in the tropics 
would be passed on to their children.)  Even without the efforts of scientists to acquire new 
information, the Enlightenment view of what species were became increasingly difficult to 
maintain as the 19th century wore on. 
 Two new kinds of scientific findings also hurt the Enlightenment view.  The first was the 
vast expansion in the variety of plants and animals that scientists were learning about.  Each new 
part of the world opened up to serious study by Europeans resulted in the discovery of new 
varieties, most of them fairly specific to that place.  Simultaneously, knowledge of ancient Egypt 
was growing rapidly.  The pyramids had been dated fairly accurately to about 3,000 years ago; 
and the recovered artifacts indicated that the people, animals, and plants of that era were quite 
similar to those of present-day Egypt and the Mediterranean. 
 Together these new findings made the idea of essence-as-algorithm untenable.  Since 
Noah's Ark beached at Ararat about 4,100 years ago--a fact that no one had any reason to 
question--and since varieties changed very little in the last 3,000 years, there was no reason to 
think they had changed much in the 1100 years between Ararat and the pyramids.  The 
algorithms just could not work fast enough to produce in only 1100 years, from only a few 




done a whole lot more work 4100 years ago than the Enlightenment scientists gave them credit 
for. 
 Thus, for instance, Louis Agassiz, the great Swiss and American naturalist, developed a 
theory about "centers of creation": species were created in the locations that were meant for 
them, and generally did not wander far from those places.  
 Early 19th century scientists maintained the notion of species-as-essence and of creation 
(even of the date of creation).  The part of Enlightenment science they jettisoned was the idea 
that the essence was an algorithm.  There were more species (Morton, for instance, "[R]egarded 
several breeds of dogs as separate species because their skeletons resided in the Egyptian 
catacombs, as recognizable and distinct from other breeds as they are now." [Gould, 1981, 
p.52]), and they were less malleable.  God hard-wired you at creation. 
 In anthropology, the Enlightenment approach also suffered because it seemed old-
fashioned.  As those sciences that made no appeal to spiritual qualities of humans experienced 
greater success, the paeans that the Enlightenment wrote about humanity seemed increasingly a 
diversion from the serious study of nature.  Similarly, the insistence on a literal interpretation of 
Genesis--a single creation event--seemed outmoded.  Paradoxically, it was the least modern parts 
of Enlightenment science that created the space that let it sound so modern. 
 The 19th century also saw a growing gap between Europeans (and their descendants) and 
the rest of the world, not the convergence the Enlightenment foresaw as Africans abroad 
adjusted to a better climate and they and all the other non-European races absorbed European 
wisdom and religion.  European military dominance increased.  Miscegenation became prevalent 





 Some peculiarly American forces may have been at work, too.  Blumenbach's chief 
somatic argument for the unity of mankind was the lack of any sharp distinction between races.  
Thus in the Old World, French shaded into Italians, Italians into Sicilians, Sicilians into Berbers, 
Berbers into Moors, and Moors into Senegambians.  But in the US, no such intermediate groups 
existed: with Native Americans either exterminated or transported to the West, there were only 
Africans and northern Europeans.  It was much easier to believe races were discrete. 
 The extraordinary success that Europeans had enjoyed in displacing Native Americans 
may also have reinforced the perception of European superiority.  So, too, did the prosperity and 
abundance of the new nation:  how could climate count for so much and race for so little when 
you contrasted with the Native Americans had accomplished in a few millennia in, say, Ohio, 
with what Europeans had done there is a few decades?  A sympathetic reviewer of Morton's 
Crania Americana wrote:   
 "One of the most singular features in the history of this continent, is, that the 
 aboriginal races, with few exceptions, have perished or constantly receded, before the 
 Anglo-Saxon race, and have in no instance...mingled with them as equals...These 
 phenomena must have a cause...." (Combe, 1840, p. 252, cited by Gould, 1981, p.  51) 
 
 But while polygeny and the greatly enhanced role for genetic inheritance that it implied 
were good ways of maintaining important elements of Enlightenment thought--essentialism, 
divine creation, the Biblical chronology--in the face of mounting disconfirming evidence, this 
new way of looking at nature faced a major challenge in partitioning individuals into species.  
Ray's interfertility criterion and the scholastic differentia specifica had done this job for the 




 The problem that the interfertility criterion presented for polygeny is obvious:  one 
cannot simultaneously maintain that races are different species, that mulattoes are fertile, and 
that individuals are partitioned into species by the interfertility criterion. 
 The polygenists solved this problem by relaxing both of the other propositions enough 
that they could still believe the first.  They rewrote the interfertility criterion to require only that 
the offspring of different species have a certain quality, and then they argued that mulattos had 
that quality.  Exactly what that quality was, the polygenists had some difficulty in articulating.  
Our best translation is, "sufficiently infertile that a dynasty will die out after a few generations."  
And they maintained, in the absence of good demographic data to the contrary, that the mulatto 
population was going to die out soon.4  A scientist like Agassiz was following popular 
convention when in 1863 he contrasted the "manly population descended from the cognate 
nations of the United States" with the "effeminate progeny of mixed races." (Gould, 1981, p. 40). 
 Weakening the interfertility criterion, while it helped solve the polygenists' original 
problem, was not without consequences.  Weak or relative infertility of hybrids ensured that at 
any time the vast majority of individuals would have inherited the essence of their species 
undiluted, and so in this regard it worked almost as well as the Enlightenment's strong infertility 
criterion.  As an operational matter, however, weak infertility is a much more cumbersome 
criterion than strong.  With strong infertility, if you want to find out whether individual A and 
individual B are members of the same species, all you need to do is breed them and see if the 
progeny are fertile; a matter of a generation.  With weak infertility, you need to wait several 
generations to answer this most basic question.  For studying fruit-flies this waiting is not a 




 Because the weak infertility criterion was a much less useful tool than the strong for 
studying long-lived populations, polygenists had to put more emphasis on physical differences 
instead of on fertility behavior in drawing lines between species.  For races of humanity, finding 
a differentia specifica (or differentia essentialis) became a much more pressing, and in 1850, a 
still unsolved problem. 
 Notice that everything the polygenists did added to the burden that the untestable and 
unobservable essence of each race had to bear.  For the Enlightenment, racial essences didn't 
even exist, since only species could have essences (because only within species was descent 
restricted).  Polygeny created the idea of a racial essence, and then forced on it most of the 
weight of assigning individuals to races in the short run, since the only kind of fertility 
information that could be used was long-run and a differential specifica had not yet been found. 
 By the publication of Darwin's, Origin of Species in 1859, typological thinking supported 
the discrete separation of mankind into hierarchically ranked races each fixed in position along 
the Great Chain of Being.  Environmental theories for diversity had been replaced by the new 
majority view of separate origins.  This helped to fix the contrasts as innate and permanent--part 
of each person's essential nature.  Body form was inextricably linked to behavior (in part a 
contribution from phrenology) and then abstracted to race.  
  
IV.  The Darwinian Revolution 
 In 1859 Darwin's Origin of Species appeared in print and sold out on the first day.  
Within ten to fifteen years most biologists accepted evolution as a general theory of the living 




  A.  What Darwin Said 
 Mankind was once again united as one species, now the product of evolutionary 
processes.  Darwin's theory of a biological continuum of man and animals, physically, mentally 
and morally should have marked the demise of the Great Chain but puzzlingly, the key concepts 
of fixity, ranking, and essentialism remained intact.  Researchers would call themselves 
evolutionists while keeping alive a racial science of fixed essential types, the direct antithesis of 
Darwin's focus on populational variability, the food for natural selection's continuous change.   
 Darwin provided an account of natural history that was simpler and more complete than 
the Genesis narrative.  Since one of the strongest arguments for polygeny depended on the 
Biblical timetable, this reduced the appeal of polygeny.  On the other hand, a major part of the 
Enlightenment argument also rested on Genesis--Adam and Eve as the source of mankind's 
unity--and so traditional monogeny also suffered. 
 With respect to fixity, the early Darwinian theorists generally held that natural selection 
was no longer operating on man (for Wallace, man had escaped it because of his inventiveness).  
Thus the diversity that presently existed, be it a result of adaptation or sexual selection, came 
about long ago and had since remained fixed.  In The Descent of Man, Darwin offers a 
hypothesis of early race formation and stasis (Stepan, 1982).5  Further, as Stepan says, by 
viewing races as now fixed units, Darwin unintentionally bolstered the idea of fixed types, 
reinforcing instead of undermining essentialistic thinking. 
 Explanations for the persistence of ranking are also complex but may be rooted in the 
analyses of anatomical gradations that had become central to science in the early part of the 
century and had helped to revive the Great Chain.  In structuring the argument for a relationship 
among forms and for the descent of man, Darwin needed small steps of continuity and the "lower 




moral conscience in human races and later about the scale of  civilization.  While Darwin was 
trying to argue for the continuity of a single human species, it was all too easy to misinterpret his 
meaning to see races as forming an evolutionary scale.  The new evolutionary language as 
applied to race would argue that the "lower races" had evolved the least far, they had lost the 
struggle for survival, that they were unfit.6 
 The partial ordering that evolution contained allowed scientists to rank races in terms of 
"development".  Europeans were the most highly developed race because they used to live like 
the other races now live, but no longer do so; and because they conquered the other races.  
Africans lived like Europeans lived a long time ago; therefore they were not as developed.  
James Bryce, a British Liberal, for instance, gave a well-received series of lectures in 1902 
entitled, The Relations of the Advanced and Backward Races of Mankind. 
 
  B.  What Race Science Heard 
 Darwin didn't provide any new facts about humans or refute any old ones.  The 
predominant response in biology was to maintain as much of the old way of looking at human 
variation as possible, and to pluck a little of the low-hanging fruit that Darwin had exposed.  
Thus Darwin did not upset the stylized fact of relative mulatto infertility that the polygenists had 
established.  Therefore, you could still think of Africans as descendants of Ham and Europeans 
as descendants of Shem, even though you no longer believed in "Ham" and "Shem;" the picture 




 As far as causality is concerned, the polygenists' view of the role of environment was 
easy to rephrase and replaced the long-held Enlightenment view.  Instead of relying on the 
Creator's wisdom to match type with environment, scientists could now rely on evolution (either 
natural selection, mutation, or inheritance of acquired characteristics--all three mechanisms had 
their adherents in the late 19th century).  Unlike the Enlightenment thinkers who believed 
Europeans were beautiful because their climate was salubrious, post-Darwinian anthropologists 
thought Europeans were smart and diligent because their climate was harsh:  "[The Negro's] 
environment has not been such as would tend to produce in him the  restless energy which 
has led to the progress of the white race; and the easy  conditions of tropical life and the 
fertility of the soil have reduced the struggle for  existence to a minimum....[S]kill in 
reckoning is necessary for the White race, and it  has cultivated this faculty; but it is not 
necessary to the Negro." (Willcox, 1911) 
 
 Darwinism was thus compatible with the idea that each race has its own essence, and so 
the idea of racial essence survived the Darwinian revolution intact.  For each environment, there 
is some best way of coping, a combination of mental and physical capacities that best allowed 
humans to thrive, and the body and mind that represented these was the ideal type, the essence of 
the race that inhabited that environment. 
 With racial essences (and separate lineages) intact, whether or not races were considered 
separate species became a semantic question to which great attention did not have to be devoted. 
 Perhaps we all had some common ancestors who were recognizably human a long time ago; 
perhaps we didn't.  Because races had essences and species didn't, race was a more important 




 In regard to apes, Darwin's ideas served to provide a natural, not merely conventional and 
nominal tie between them and humans.  Darwin obliterated Buffon's infinite gap between man 
and animals.  God didn't create humans ex nihilo; they evolved with chimps from an ape 
ancestor, just as mosquitoes and radishes evolved from other animals and plants. 
 The other piece of evidence for African inferiority was the alleged similarity between 
them and apes--in appearance (e.g. prognathism) and habitat.  After Darwin, the inference was 
obvious:  because they resembled apes more than Europeans did, Africans had travelled less far 
on the road of human development, the road that started with apes.  Merit was uni-dimensional, 
and Africans, like apes, lacked it. 
 In sum, fixity persisted, ranking persisted and essentialistic thinking persisted.  Now, 
within the framework of evolutionary theory, the association between apes and some humans, 
specifically Africans, was given "scientific validation". 
 
IV.  Racial Science after Darwin 
 After Darwin and the Civil War, racial science faced two great challenges.  The first was 
scientific:  Finding a differentia specifica to tell the races apart.  The second was policy-oriented: 
 figuring out how to predict and manage the interface between advanced and less developed 
races.  Neither of these challenges could even be articulated in the language of Enlightenment 
science or in the language we use today.  Still, after the return of the Great Chain, polygenism 




  A.  Telling Races Apart 
    1.  Why it Mattered 
 For race scientists after Darwin, finding some physical characteristic that partitioned 
humans by the geographical location of their ancestors circa 1500 AD was thus crucial for 
maintaining the reality of races.  If races had essences, then the essence of each race had to show 
up some way (at least in 1500) other than mailing address.  Mere correlation would not do 
(unless perhaps it was dazzlingly high).  Essences are like noses and mothers:  everybody 
(except half-breeds) must have precisely one--no more, no less.  To make racial essences part of 
hard science, you had to find their physical expressions.  That is what race scientists set out to 
do. 
    2.  How They Tried 
 In the second half of the 1800s the basic definition of physical anthropology was the 
study of human variation defined as group comparison.  As the study of race became more 
professional, new and more precise techniques were developed.  Even if racial types were 
conceived of as fixed in the past and to some extent intermingled now, it was still thought by 
some that one could discern elements of the original types.  Measurement would be used not 
only to quantify contrasts but to help chart the evolutionary trajectory of human diversity. 
 In the 18th century, Camper had begun modern craniometry with his introduction of the 
facial angle (another debt to Aristotle).7  Now all aspects of the skull would be examined 
including cranial dimensions, patterns of growth, suture closure, and the all-important contents 
of the cranium--the brain.  By the century's close, Ripley (1899) would report that over ten 
million children and half a million adults in the US and Europe had been measured for their 
"racial identity".  The cephalic index, the ratio of head length to head breadth, was the next 




become the most important measure of head shape used in the second half of the 19th century.  
Its most common use was in distinguishing among different European "peoples" or "races".  
While there is no general attempt at this point to assign relative worth according the cephalic 
index, these data would be used in the interpretations of past and present history. 
 While populations were being sorted by cranial form, others focused on different 
features, often using them directly to point to the evolutionary inferiority of some races, most 
particularly of the African (Gossett, 1965).  Gratiolet had earlier argued that coronal suture 
closure happened earlier in Africans, thus limiting the potential growth of their brains.  Now, in 
the wake of Darwin, this could take on evolutionary significance. 
 Another primary area of research included the brain.  In addition to the work conducted 
by Paul Broca, founder of the Anthropological Society of Paris and father of French 
Anthropology, others followed suit.  Researchers such as Bean, Fiske, Mall and Deniker, to 
name just a few, compared weights, convolutional patterns and various aspects of cerebellar 
form.  While some would find racial differences (Bean, Fiske), in the end Bean would virtually 
stand alone against the wealth of data (Deniker, Mall, Broca) and the conclusion first offered by 
Tiedemann (1836) that clear distinctions across racial lines could not be drawn. 
 When skulls and their contents failed to provide a criterion to distinguish among races, 
many cast a wider net in the search for useful criteria.  These included body lice (Darwin, 
Murray) as well as hair (Bory de Saint-Vincent, Broca, Browne, Haeckel,  
Huxley, Keane, Muller and Prunner-Bey).8 
 Ultimately, by the end of the 19th century, the leading scientists who had studied skulls, 
brains, hair, skin, etc. had arrived at the same conclusion:  the search for distinct human types 
was an exercise in futility.  Keane (1889), Ranke (1894), Deniker (1900) and Virchow (1896) 




 Despite the development of new techniques, scientific rigor and exhaustive research, by 
the end of the century physical anthropology, the science of human variation, had failed to 
validate the reality of racial types.  John Wesley Powell, director of the Bureau of Ethnology of 
the Smithsonian would say in the 1880s that, "there is no science of ethnology" (meaning the 
determination of race differences) (Gossett, 1965, p. 83).  
Topinard, Broca's disciple, would also arrive at the conclusion that races were abstractions.  His 
comments sound eerily modern. 
 "[R]ace is only a subjective notion.  The only objective reality is what we have before 
 our eyes: peoples and tribes.  Under such conditions one questions whether it would 
 not be preferable to be less free with the word race...."(1892, p. 176) 
 
 Yet, typological thinking did not disappear.  There was still faith in the reality of racial 
distinctions that were innate, biologically based, and through their relative worth, indicative of 
evolutionary success.9   
 
  B.  Managing the Inferiors 
    1.  Institutionalizing Anthropology 
 The institutionalization of anthropology in the US and abroad would serve to solidify an 
image of ranked races.  Practioners in this field on both sides of the Atlantic were called upon for 
their expertise in "managing the inferiors".  In Britain, the newly formed Anthropological 
Institute worked to restore respectability to the field of race science and saw its contribution as 
an imperative for administering a multiracial empire (Lorimer, 1977 p. 26).  The same held for 
the expanding colonial empires of France, The Netherlands and Germany as they called on both 
physical and cultural anthropology for the information needed to deal with populations in Africa, 




 In the US, the field was shaped by the unique situation of internal colonialism.  The 
Smithsonian Institution was founded in 1846 and was followed by the Bureau of American 
Ethnology in 1872.  The goal of the latter echoes that of the AI in Britain, as they would study 
the native American in order to know how best to deal with them, "for their own good".  
 Critically, the dominant intellectual perspective of the day, evolution, now undergirded 
cultural anthropology (ethnology) as well as the biological sphere.  The scientific study of 
society/culture was based on the "biological laws" of struggle, survival and adaptation, and upon 
progress along an evolutionary scale.  The cultural evolution of E.B. Tyler, Herbert Spencer and 
Lewis Henry Morgan served as a complement to biological inquiry.  Baker (1998) cogently 
demonstrates the important role of institutionalized anthropology, most notably that of the 
Smithsonian, in presenting to the public a "scientific" representation of the hierarchy of races 
through living ethnology displays at turn of the century expositions and World's Fairs. 
 Lorimer (1997, p. 23) argues that in Victorian England, the role that science played with 
respect to race served to reconcile, at least to some degree, "the contradictions between 
democracy at home and imperialism abroad."  The same argument can be put forth for the 
treatment of so-called lower races within the confines of the US.  A skewed take on Darwinian 
theory would be used in the US to account for social, political, economic and even physical 
inequality. 
    2.  Apes and Medicine 
 The link between Africans and apes evident at earlier historical junctures was now 
revitalized not by the field of physical anthropology but by medicine.  Physicians made 
numerous comparisons between apes and the varieties of man, typically finding African-
Americans approximating apes in one dimension or another.  Comments on various aspects of 




only anatomically modern humans, not even Neandertals possess one) supplemented the now 
familiar remarks about the degree of African facial prognathism.  Moreover, the medical 
profession moved beyond the craniometric focus that had been at the heart of physical 
anthropology.  Through their analyses of postcranial anatomy, they would call into question the 
African-American condition with respect to one of the principal defining human characteristics--
erect posture.  From Aristotle (man as a featherless biped) through Blumenbach and even today, 
erect posture and concomitant bipedalism distinguish humankind.  While presented in seemingly 
innocuous tones, comments about  the "simian nature" of the African pelvis, vertebral column, or 
limb form clearly resonated the African-ape tie.  For example:  "Dr. Van Evrie felt that because 
of the Negro's physiological place in nature, he was 'incapable of an erect or direct perpendicular 
posture.'  The structure of his limbs, the form of his pelvis and spine, and the way the head was 
set on the shoulders gave the Negro a 'slightly stooping posture."  (Haller, 1971, p.49).  In 1899, 
the Journal of Anatomy and Physiology would publish an article by J. Arthur Thomson entitled, 
"The influence of posture on the form of the articular surfaces of the tibia and astragalus in the 
different races of man and the higher apes." (Haller, 1971). 
    3.  Anticipating Extinction 
 What happened when advanced and backward races came into contact with each other?  
Opinions were divided, but the consensus was that the backward race was doomed.  In the end, 
in the evolutionary struggle of the most fit, the fate of the African was sealed.  Drawing on the 
dictum that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, the foetal African (and infantile Asian) would be 
no match for the European.  Based on the "hard" data from anthropometry, medicine and the 
census, physical and mental decline was inevitable.  In 1862, Joseph Camp, statistician and 
superintendent of the 1860 census, stated that the "gradual extinction of the Negro was an 




incorrectly reported that the growth rate for African-American population was only 9.86%, a 
sharp contrast to the 29.98% average for this population from 1790-1850 and 24.5% less than 
that of European-Americans for the decade (Haller, 1970a, pp. 317-318).  This supposed 
decrease in population growth was almost entirely due to severe underenumeration in the 
Southern states, which were still undergoing Reconstruction.  (The Census Bureau now 
publishes alternative estimates for 1870). 
 The strains of Spencer and social Darwinism can be seen in a response to optimistic 
claims by sociologists that the African-American population was increasing.  Dr. Eugene R. 
Corson writes in The New York Medical Times in 1887,  
 "Thrown into 'the struggle for existence' with a civilization 'of which he is not the 
 product,' the Negro 'must suffer physically, a result which forbids any undue increase 
 of the race, as well as the preservation of the race characteristics."  (Cited in Haller, 
 1971, pp.47-48) 
 
 A sampling of titles from the medical journals of the time further serves to illustrate this 
preoccupation:  "The Negro problem from a medical standpoint", 1886; "The future of the 
colored race in the United States from an ethnic and medical standpoint", 1887; "The effects of 
emancipation upon the mental and physical qualifications of the Negro in the South, 1896"; "The 
effect of freedom upon the physical and psychological development of the Negro", 1900; "The 
future of the negro from the standpoint of the southern physician", 1902; and "Deterioration of 




 The demise of the African in America was one of the most widespread beliefs in 
medicine and anthropology in the late 1800s (Haller, 1971).  (Darity, 1994, documents the 
impact of this belief on the American Economics Association).  Policy would match biology 
with segregation and disenfranchisement among the, "first steps toward preparing the Negro race 
for its extinction." (Haller, 1970b p. 167).  The impact of this belief can be seen on a practical 
level as, for example, some of the largest insurers of African-Americans reduced the benefits of 
those who had been issued policies based on European-American mortality rates. 
 While the prognosis of extinction would be amended in the early 1900s, the evolutionary 
fate of African-Americans was far from optimistic.  In losing the struggle for survival they 
would be left as a remnant and peripheral population. 
    4.  Partially Dissenting Voices 
 Not all thinkers agreed that backward races in contact with advanced races were doomed. 
 A sizeable neo-Lamarckian minority thought that backward races could be slowly uplifted 
through the right kind of contact with advanced races.  The best known 
proponents of this view at the turn of the century were Theodore Roosevelt and Booker T. 
Washington.  Neither was a professional scientist himself, but both were in contact with leading 
scientists.  As it became clearer, however, that Mendelian genetics rather than the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics was the mechanism through which evolution proceeded, 
neo-Lamarckianism became untenable and faded away.10 
 Another partially dissenting stream was also represented within the African-American 
community:  the religious writers like Harvey Johnson, and more secular W.E.B. DuBois.  
Johnson (1891), a Baltimore Baptist minister, argues for the superiority of the African race over 
the Caucasian because of the more honorable origins of the African in the Biblical story of Ham 




race with Romulus and Remus. 
 DuBois, on the other hand, rejects the Great Chain of Being and argues, like an 
economist, that different races have different comparative advantages; a one-dimensional scale 
of merit is not appropriate:   
 "We are that people whose subtle sense of song has given America its only American 
 music, its only American fairly tales, its only touch of pathos and humor amid its  mad 
money-getting plutocracy." (1897, p. 114) 
 
 What is most telling, though, for the purposes of our argument, is that by the end of the 
19th century, all of the leading voices in the African-American community accept 
race-essentialism, even though they differ among themselves and with the Euro-American 
mainstream on the future and ranking of the races.  Indeed, it is hard to find a more eloquent 
expression of essentialism than DuBois (1897): 
     "[T]he history of the world is the history, not of individuals, but of groups, not of 
 nations, but of races, and he who ignores or seeks to override the race idea in  
 human history ignores and overrides the central thought of all history....We see the 
 Pharaohs, Caesars, Toussaints and Napoleons of history and forget the vast races of 
 which they were but epitomized expressions." (p. 110) 
The distance from Frederick Douglass less than a half century before is immense--at least as 
great as the distance from Mill to Marshall.11 
 By the dawn of the new century, the general perspective on human diversity on both 
sides of the Atlantic was tightly swathed in the language of biology, though not supported by the 
results of a century of scientific investigation.  Differences were innate, fixed, and ranked.  The 





VI.  Conclusion 
 It should not be surprising that economists changed how they viewed race between 1700 
and 1900; everybody else did, too--most especially natural scientists.  At the beginning of the 
period we've look at, scientists had a very poor understanding of how nature operated--so poor 
that they could not explain how Europeans became stronger, richer, and better than other people 
around the world.  Over the course of two hundred years and through the combined efforts of 
scientists from a variety of newly forming disciplines, vast quantities of information were 
gathered and digested.  Biology and anthropology struggled to understand not only man's 
relationship to other animals and his place in the natural world but also sought insights into the 
relationships among men, how they differed from one another and why.  By 1900 Europeans and 
European-Americans could finally explain coherently why they were superior.  "Science" had 
provided an answer, nearly.  It is not a happy tale that we tell. 
 But it is an instructive one.  Not many people today are smarter than Linnaeus, Darwin or 
DuBois, or more moral than Kant or Blumenbach.  The questions we ask are not that different 
either:  why people in some parts of the world are so much richer than people in other parts; why 
police are corrupt in Mexico City; why African-Americans are about six times as likely to be 
incarcerated or murdered as European-Americans; why only five of the 316 people who 
graduated with one of the authors from a Newark public high school 30 years ago still maintain 
addresses in Newark; how humans got to be the way they are. 
 Of course, today these questions have solid answers that don't appeal to racial 
essentialism or to the Great Chain of Being.  Each question, in fact, has several such solid 
answers--and none of them is so convincing and simple that the questions have really been 
answered.  If natural and social scientists today really knew the answers to these questions, they 




 As we look among ourselves (or to our closest relatives, the other apes), Plato's gift is 
still with us.  If clear, simple, convincing answers for these questions don't exist outside the 
world of biological or cultural racial essentialism, why should we be surprised that for many 






1.  Prior to the 1700s terms like race and species were used by learned persons in a loose generic 
sense that was roughly synonymous with kind,type and variety.  Further, none of the terms 
referred specifically or exclusively to physical traits though such features were normally a part of 
the general description.  Blumenbach takes "principal variety" as a synonym for "race"; and only 
in Kant is the term "race" used and formally defined. 
 
2.  This concern with good climate and with beauty also led to the naming of the "Caucasian" 
race.  The story begins with Bernier, who encountered Circassian slave women in Turkey and 
Persia, and concluded on the basis of this evidence that people from the Caucasus were the 
handsomest on earth.  Buffon echoed this sentiment.  Blumenbach, using their accounts and also 
having in his possession a single skull from the region, came to the same conclusion.  He thought 
it likely, therefore, that mankind in general and Europeans in particular had originated from this 
region, and so named the European race after Mount Caucasus.  From Blumenbach, "I have 
taken the name of this variety from Mount Caucasus...because its neighborhood...produces the 
most beautiful race of men,...; and because all physiological reasons converge to this, that in that 
region if anywhere, it seems we ought with greatest probability place the autochthones of 
mankind.  For in the first place, that stock displays, as we have seen..., the most beautiful form of 
the skull....Besides it is white in color, which we may fairly assume to have been the primitive 
color of mankind, since, as we have shown above..., it is very easy for that to degenerate into 
brown, but very much more difficult for dark to become white, when the secretion and 
precipitation of this carbonaceous pigment...has once deeply struck." (1776/1795, p. 36) 
 
3.  For a full analysis of Morton's results see Gould (1981/1996) and for a critique and reanalysis 
more favorable to Morton see Michael (1988). 
 
4.  In a world where most slave traders were polygenists and you were not, you could make 
money by outbidding them for mulatto women, since their fertility expectations were irrational.  
But not much money, since Fogel et al. estimate that a fecund woman was worth only about 8% 
more than a sterile woman (1992, p. 325) and any differential fertility was either small or very 
far in the future.  Most slave traders, moreover, were monogenists. 
 
5.  As for explanations for the origin of the diversity, neither Darwin nor Wallace focused on the 
correlates between physical traits and environmental adaptations.  Darwin in fact came to the 
conclusion that racial traits were not adaptive and explained them in terms of sexual selection 
(Stepan, 1982). 
 
6.  In fairness, the lack of consensus among early evolutionists on aspects of the theory (Darwin, 
Wallace, Huxley) coupled with an incomplete understanding of the genetics of inheritance 
(which would take until the middle of the following century) contributed to the failure to develop 





7.  The facial angle is a line drawn through the lower part of the nose and the orifice of the ear.  
For Camper, this provided a standard for comparing forms and accordingly is regarded by many 
scholars, as the beginning of modern craniology.  The smaller the angle, the more ape-like.  
Humans ranged from 70-100, from the African to the Greek of antiquity.  As orang utans had a 
facial angle of 58, Camper placed the African as closer to the ape than to the European. 
 
8.  It is interesting and puzzling that the African-ape morphological link, found in common 
imagery as well as in science at this time, is not similarly applied to the analyses of hair.  The 
hair of Africans was likened to that of another non-human, the sheep, "the hair of the white man 
will not felt, but the wool of the Negro will felt." (Browne, 1850, p.8)  The fact that ape hair 
closely resembles that of non-African peoples is not deemed of consequence. 
 
9.  Looking at a conjunction of characteristics rather than at a single trait makes it easier to 
identify uniquely the geographic origin of many individuals, but the cost is that many individuals 
can not be identified at all.  This is the approach of modern forensic anthropology.  For example, 
among the standard "European" features are a narrow face, a sharp nasal sill, a narrow distance 
between eye orbits, little facial prognathism, and a prominent chin.  An "African" cranium has a 
narrow face (in contrast to a wider "Asian" face) no nasal sill, a wide distance between the eye 
orbits, alveolar prognathism and a chin that only projects slightly Bass (1987).  These 
combinations of features sort with a high degree of accuracy the skulls that fall in one category 
or another.  But many skulls fall in neither category (or fall in both). 
 
10.  Mendel's work wasn't resurrected until 1902 and despite August Weismann's theory of 
germplasm back in 1869, Lamarck's ideas were still powerful in some circles into the 1900s. 
 
11.  There is some reason to believe that in the twentieth century DuBois became less of an 
essentialist under the influence of anthropologists like Franz Boas.  See, for instance, his essay, 
The First Universal Races Congress (1911).  On the other hand, as late as 1939, Melville 
Herskovitz was finding racial essentialism in Black Folk:  Then and Now.  For a discussion of 
this controversy, see Lewis (2000), pp. 455-56.  Whatever DuBois believed later in his life, it is 
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